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RIGHT TO COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL FOR
MISDEMEANANTS IN VIRGINIA
The Virginia Constitution makes no specific guarantee of the right
to counsel for those charged with a crime as is provided in the federal
Constitution,1 but the Supreme Court of Appeals has declared this to be
a fundamental right within the Virginia Bill of Rights.2 Such right is
intended to apply to all persons regardless of their financial status,"
so if a person charged with a felony proceeds in forma pauperis, it is
the duty of the court to appoint counsel to defend him.4 The right to
court-appointed counsel has been extended to persons being questioned
concerning a felony, 5 to those being tried for a felony," to those effect-
ing an appeal for a felony conviction,7 and to juveniles during confine-
ment hearings in state juvenile courts." However, it has never been
extended to those charged with a misdemeanor in Virginia.
The problem of how far the right to court-appointed counsel should
be extended has arisen as a result of the United States Supreme Court's
decisions that the duty to provide counsel for indigent defendants ap-
1U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense."
2 "He [the accused] shall not be deprived of life or liberty, except by the law of
the land or the judgment of his peers... ." VA. CoNsT. art. I, § 8 (1902). This section
has been interpreted as guaranteeing the right to counsel in felony trials. See Barnes v.
Commonwealth, 92 Va. 794, 23 S.E. 784 (1895). See also Cradle v. Peyton, 208 Va.
243, 156 S.E.2d 874 (1967); Morris v. Smyth, 202 Va. 832, 120 S.E.2d 465 (1961);
Fitzgerald v. Smyth, 194 Va. 681, 74 S.E.2d 810 (1953); Watkins v. Commonwealth,
174 Va. 518, 6 S.E.2d 670 (1940).
3 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-241.1 (Cum. Supp. 1968).
4 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-241.3 (Cum. Supp. 1968).
5 See Cardwell v. Commonwealth, 209 Va. 68, 161 S.E.2d 787 (1968); Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 208 Va. 740, 160 S.E.2d 793 (1968); Dailey v. Commonwealth, 208
Va. 452, 158 S.E.2d 731 (1968); Durham v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 415, 158 S.E.2d 135
(1967).
6 VA. CODE ANN. § 19.1-241.1 (Cum. Supp. 1968). See also Fitzgerald v. Smyth, 194
Va. 681, 74 S.E.2d 810 (1953); Watkins v. Commonwealth, 174 Va. 518, 6 S.E.2d 670
(1940).
7 See Thacker v. Peyton, 206 Va. 771, 146 S2E.2d 176 (1966); Cabaniss v. Cunningham,
206 Va. 330, 143 S.E.2d 911 (1965).
8 See n re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Gregory v. Peyton, 208 Va. 157, 156 S.E.2d 624
(1967); Peyton v. French, 207 Va. 73, 147 S.E.2d 739 (1966); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-173
(Gum. Supp. 1968). See also Cradle v. Peyton, 208 Va. 243, 156 S.E.2d 874 (1967).




plies to state,9 as well as federal, courts.1° The right was first extended
only to those persons charged with capital offenses1 who were so un-
familiar with the processes of the law that they could not adequately
defend themselves.' 2 Later the Court established the "special circum-
stances" rule,13 extending the right to those charged with felonies only
if the special circumstances of the case, such as ignorance of the de-
fendant or complexity of the defense, required that counsel be ap-
pointed to insure due process.'4 Finally, in Gideon v. Wainwright,:5 the
Supreme Court rejected the "special circumstances" standard and
further extended the right to court-appointed counsel to all persons
charged with felonies who could not afford retained counsel.
16
The Gideon decision, strictly interpreted, applies only to those per-
sons charged with a felony. However, the opinion left open the pos-
sibility of its application to misdemeanor cases as well.'7 As a result,
OSee Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); cf. Powell v. Alabama,
287 U.S. 45 (1932).
-
0 See Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
11See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). Nine Negroes were charged with
raping two white girls in Alabama. The trial judge appointed the entire Scottsboro
bar to defend them,, never specifically assigning an attorney to their defense. The
defendants were thus denied due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.
'
2 However, the Supreme Court in Powell recognized that even educated persons who
had no legal training would not be able to prepare an adequate defense if charged with
a crime. An unjust conviction could result merely because the accused did not know
how to properly assert his innocence. This line of reasoning was later reinforced in
Gideon. See Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948).
13See Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
14 "[W]hile want of counsel in a particular case may result in a conviction lacking in
such fundamental fairness, we cannot say that the [Fourteenth] Amendment embodies
an inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly.
conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel."
l(. at 473. See generally Green, The Bill of Rights, the Fourteenth Amendment and
the "Supreme Court, 46 MsicH. L. REv. 869 (1948); 42 COLUM. L. Rv. 1205 (1942); 
22
S. CAr. L. REV. 259 (1949); 91 U. PA. L. REv. 78 (1942); 33 VA. L. Rav. 731 (1947),
'i 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
16The defendant was accused of breaking and entering with intent to commit a
misdemeanor, which is a felony in Florida. He was refused appointed counsel and
received a five year prison sentence. The Court held that the sixth amendments right
to counsel was "fundamental and essential to a fair trial" and made binding on the
states by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 342.
17 "The special circumstances rule has been formally abandoned in capital cases, and
the time has now come when it should be similarly abandoned in noncapital cases.
at least as to offenses which, as the one involved here, carry the possibility of a
substantial prison sentence. (Whether the rule should be extended to all criminal
cases need not now be decided.)" Id. at 351. (Harlan, J., concurring opinion).
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many conflicting decisions' 8 have arisen as to whether Gideon should
be so extended. Some states have gone so far as to extend the right to
court-appointed counsel to persons vharged with any crime which
could possibly result in loss of liberty.' 9 Others have adopted the less
liberal position of providing counsel only in the more serious misde-
meanor cases, 20 while a minority still refuse appointed counsel to any
person charged with a misdemeanor.21
Adding to the difficulty created by the language in Gideon is the
fact that the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in three cases2 2 arising
since that decision, all of which specifically raised the issue of the
right to court-appointed counsel for one charged with a misdemeanor.
Many courts have interpreted this refusal as an indication that Gideon
was intended to apply only to those charged with felonies.23 The Court's
refusal to face the issue was criticized by Justice Stewart:
18 Compare Bolkovac v. State, 229 Ind. 294, 98 N.E.2d 250 (1951); State v. Borst, 278
Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967); Stevenson v. Holzman, ... Ore. ... , 458 P.2d 414
(1969); 'with Watkins v. Morris, 179 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1965); State v. Brown, 250
La. 1023, 201 So. 2d 277 (1967); City of Toledo v. Frazier, 10 Ohio App. 2d 51, 226
N.E.2d 777 (1967); Hendrix v. City of Seattle, ... Wash. ... , 456 P.2d 696 (1969).
19 See, e.g., In re Johnson, 62 Cal. 2d 325, 398 P.2d 420, 42 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1965).
California draws no distinction between felonies, misdemeanors, and petty offenses in
extending the right to court-appointed counsel.
2 0 See People v. Letterio, 16 N.Y.2d 307, 213 N.E.2d 670, 266 N.Y.S.2d 368 (1965);
People v. Witenski, 15 N.Y.2d 392, 207 N.E.2d 358, 259 N.Y.S.2d 413 (1965). Some
states have adopted modified rules for the application of appointed counsel. Arizona
now requires that counsel "nust be provided in all cases where the maximum
[punishment] exceeds $500 in fines or six months imprisonment, or both, and may be
provided if the trial court in its discretion believes that the complexity of the case
is such that the ends of justice require legal representation." Burrage v. Superior Court,
105 Ariz. 53, 459 P.2d 313, 315 (1969). In North Carolina, the judge may appoint coun-
sel for persons charged with misdemeanors if in his opinion such appointment is
warranted. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-4.1 (1963).
21 For an extensive survey of the right to court-appointed counsel as applied by each
state, see generally Junker, The Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases, 43 WASH. L.
Rav. 685, 719 (1968).
2 2 Winters v. Beck, 239 Ark. 1039, 397 S.W.2d 364 (1965), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 907
(1966); Cortinez v. Flournoy, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 925 (1966); State v. DeJoseph, 3
Conn. Cir. 624, 222 A.2d 752, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 982 (1966). But see Patterson v.
State, 227 Md. 194, 175 A.2d 746 (1961), rem. sub nom. per curiam, 372 U.S. 776,
reV'd sub nom. per curiam, 231 Md. 509, 191 A.2d 237 (1963). Here the defendant
was convicted of a misdemeanor and sentenced without being given the right to
appointed counsel. The Supreme Court remanded the case to be tried in light of
Gideon, whereupon the Maryland appellate court decreed that the defendant should
have had appointed counsel. Therefore, the inference is that Gideon was meant to
apply to serious misdemeanor cases.
23 See, e.g., Hendrix v. City of Seattle, ... Wash. ... , 456 P.2d 696 (1969).
COMMENTS
I think this Court has a duty to resolve the conflict and clarify
the scope of Gideon v. Wainwright. I do not suggest what the ulti-
mate resolution of this problem should be, but I do suggest that the
answer cannot be made to depend upon artificial or arbitrary labels
of "felony" or "misdemeanor" attached to criminal offenses by 50 dif-
ferent States .... [S]urely it is at least our duty to see to it that a
vital guarantee of the United States Constitution is accorded with an
even hand in all the States.24
Not only are there conflicting decisions among the state courts them-
selves, but there has also arisen a divergence in the opinions of state
and federal courts25 as to the application of this right. Under existing
statutes2 and rules of procedure,27 the federal courts now guarantee
the right to court-appointed counsel to any person charged with a
crime, be it a felony or a misdemeanor (excluding petty offenses).
Thus, anyone facing a charge for which the punishment is greater than
six months imprisonment and a fine of five hundred dollars28 has the
right to a court-appointed attorney. The state courts, on the other
hand, are compelled by Gideon to extend this right only to those
charged with felonies. As a result, an indigent person charged with a
misdemeanor in a state court is not guaranteed the same due process
rights as one similarly charged in a federal court, absent a statute so
providing.
No Virginia ases have been reported specifically raising the issue
of the right to court-appointed counsel for misdemeanants, but the
policy of the state seems to have been made clear by its legislature.2 9
By statute, the right to appointed counsel is specifically extended to
those charged with a felony.30 Although this basic right has been guaran-
24 Winters v. Beck, 385 U.S. 907, 908 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
2 5 An example of such a dual standard exists in Florida. The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals has extended the right to appointed counsel to those charged with mis-
demeanors. See James v. Headley, 410 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1969); Colon v. Hendry,
408 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1969) (dictum); Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (5th
Cir. 1965). However, the Florida Supreme Court has refused to extend the right
beyond felonies. See Watkins v. Morris, 179 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1965).28 See Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b) (1968).
27See FED. R. CRiM. P. 44(a) (Cum. Supp. 1969). Rule 44(a) is broader than the
Criminal Justice Act of 1964 in that the rule extends the right to appointed counsel
to defendants charged with petty offenses and to defendants unable to obtain counsel
for other than financial reasons. See Notes of Advisory Comm. on Rules, FD. R. CrUm.
P. 44(a) (Cum. Supp. 1969).
28 See 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1969).
29 See generally Manson, The Indigent in Virginia, 51 VA. L. REv. 163 (1965).30
"In any case in which a person is charged with a felony and appears for any hearing
1970]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:297
teed in Virginia for many years, the statute in its present form was
adopted three years after Gideon, indicating that the legislature strictly
construed Gideon as extending the right to court-appointed counsel
only to those charged with felonies.81 In doing so, Virginia joined a
minority of states3 2 which restrict this right to felony cases.
The use of the statutory distinction between felony and misdemeanor
as the criterion for the application of this right creates a standard which
is far too arbitrary. A felony in Virginia is any crime punishable by
death or a term of imprisonment in the state penitentiary, whereas a
misdemeanor is defined as any crime other than a felony.38 Since these
definitions may vary from state to state, they do not serve as a satis-
factory basis on which to rest the application of a fundamental con-
stitutional right.3 4 In Virginia, misdemeanor offenses are punishable by
up to twelve months in jail,3 5 while felonies are usually punishable by
a year or more in prison. "It would be a gross perversion of solid Con-
stitutional doctrine to find a rational distinction between one year in
jail (a misdemeanor) and one year and a day in prison (a felony)." ',
The absurdity of such a method of determination is emphasized in
situations in which a person is charged with several counts of the same
misdemeanor. For example, consider the situation in which a person
is accused of passing several bad checks 7 to different banks over a
period of time, each check being under the statutory amount required
before any court without being represented by counsel, such court shall, before pro-
ceeding with the hearing, appoint an attorney at law to represent him and provide
such person legal representation throughout every stage of proceeding against him."
VA. CODE Amn-. § 19.1-241.1 (Cum. Supp. 1968) [emphasis added].
81 Virginia has guaranteed by statute since 1948 the right to court-appointed counsel
to those charged with a felony. The statute was reworded by the Virginia Legislature
in 1966 with no indication of extending the right beyond felony cases.
32Among other states denying appointed counsel in any misdemeanor cases are
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Misssissippi, South Carolina, and Tennessee. See Junker,
supra note 20, at 720-21.
33VA. CoDE Aw. § 18.1-6 (1960). Most states, however, have foreseen the Supreme
Court's extension and have taken appropriate action by legislative enactment or judicial
decision to include at least some misdemeanants.
84 See generally State v. Borst, 278 Minn. 388, 154 N.W.2d 888 (1967); Kamisar,
Betts v. Brady Twenty Years Later: The Right to Counsel and Due Process Values,
61 MIcH. L. Rav. 219 (1962).
85 VA. CODE ANt. § 18.1-9 (Cum. Supp. 1968).
3 6 Arbo v. Hegstrom, 261 F. Supp. 397, 401 (D. Conn. 1966). The defendant was
convicted after pleading guilty to a charge of nonsupport (a misdemeanor). The trial
court's failure to inform defendant of his right to court-appointed counsel was held to
be a denial of due process.
37 VA. CODE ANN. § 6.1-115 (1966).
COMMENTS
for a felony3 charge. It is very likely that he could be convicted of
several counts and receive an aggregate sentence of well over a year
in jail,' 9 but since the crime with which he was charged is termed a
misdemeanor by statute, he is denied the right to court-appointed counsel
in Virginia. Compare that situation with one in which the defendant
is charged with snatching a purse containing a five dollar bill. Such a
crime, although termed a felony,0 could possibly result in a short or
suspended sentence, especially if it were a first offense for a youthful
defendant. But here, even though the term of imprisonment may be
much less than in the first example, the defendant has the right to have
counsel appointed to defend him. Situations such as these illustrate the
injustice in the system presently in effect in Virginia.
There are, of course, practical reasons for not extending the right to
court-appointed counsel to all persons charged with any crime, even
though ideally this would be desirable. To provide free counsel in every
case involving possible loss of liberty would create, no doubt, an unbear-
able burden on the members of the bar and on the state treasury.41 Even
if this right were extended only to all non-traffic violations with pos-
sible penalties of loss of liberty, the burden would doubtlessly be too
great. However, a less arbitrary line can be drawn than the one now in
effect, which relies on the statutory definitions of felony and misde-
meanor.
In order to remedy the present situation, it is necessary to have a
more subjective and elastic method of determining when the right
to appointed counsel should be invoked. One possible solution is to
supply court-appointed attorneys to those charged with an offense
which is likely to result in a substantial loss of liberty,42 regardless of
whether the offense is termed a felony or misdemeanor. The desig-
nation of which offenses warrant court-appointed counsel should be
3 8 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-100 (Cum. Supp. 1968).
39 In many states misdemeanants can be subjected to terms of imprisonment which
are much longer than the maximum statutory penalty through "dollar-a-day" statutes.
Such statutes add an extra day to the defendant's sentence for each dollar of his fine
which he is unable to pay. The result is a discrimination against indigent defendants
who must work off their fines by extended jail sentences. See generally Winters v.
Beck, 281 F. Supp. 793 (E.D. Ark. 1968), aft'd, 407 F.2d 125 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
395 U.S. 963 (1969).
4 0 VA. CODE ANN. § 18.1-100 (Cum. Supp. 1968).
•
11 See generally PREsmENr's COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCE ENT AND ADMINIS-rRATION OF
JusIcE, TAsx FORCE REPORT: THE CouRTs 52 (1967) [hereinafter cited as TAsic FoRcE
REPoRT]; Silverstein, Manpower Requirements in the Administration of Criminal justice,
TAsx FoRcE REPORT 152.
4 2 Junker, supra note 20, at 708.
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left within the discretion of the trial judge, to be decided according to
his experience in that type of case, while considering the punishment
which this particular crime usually carries. If, in the judge's opinion,
the crime with which a defendant is charged usually involves a sub-
stantial jail sentence or a complex defense,43 the accused should be in-
formed of his right to have counsel appointed. A method such as this
would supply a rationale to the application of the right, and situations
such as the one mentioned above, where the defendant is charged with
several counts of a misdemeanor, would not arise. The defendant would
be allowed a court-appointed attorney according to the probable length
of his sentence, rather than the statutory classification of the charge.44
The use of a more subjective method of appointing counsel would
still produce the problem of supplying the increased demand for legal
assistance, even though attorneys would only be appointed to indigent
defendants in selected cases. Some relief to members of the bar might
be provided by allowing third year law students to defend and prepare
cases for indigent persons charged with misdemeanors. 45 By instituting
a closely supervised, accredited course available to certain third year
students, law schools would be creating a valuable means of supple-
menting an otherwise theoretical curriculum with practical experience
in the actual worldngs of the judicial system. More importantly, such a
plan would provide some assistance for indigent persons charged with
misdemeanors, where none existed previously.
An imminent repercussion of such an extension of the right to ap-
pointed counsel would be a slowing down of the "assembly-line" 4'
process which frequently characterizes misdemeanor proceedings today.
A substantial deceleration would require the addition of more courts
to our judicial system on the misdemeanor level. However, the effect
of such a deceleration could be mitigated by withholding the right to
court-appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases until appealed to a court
43 "Many misdemeanors carry substantial jail sentences and heavy fines; they may
involve complicated factual and legal questions that require the technical resourcefulness
of a lawyer. Moreover, a misdemeanor charge may be the defendant's first criminal
involvement, and the disposition of the charge may have great bearing on his potential
for a productive future." TASK FORCE REPORT 53.
44See Beaney, The Right to Counsel: Past, Present, and Future, 49 VA. L. REv. 1150
(1963).
45Such programs have been used for several years in states such as Connecticut,
Florida and Massachusetts. See TASK FORCE REPORT 62.
46 See generally PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JUSTICE: THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967).
COMMENTS
of record to be tried de novo.4 Such solution would allow courts not
of record to deal quickly with cases in which the accused wishes to
admit his guilt and receive his punishment without further delay.48
The trend of the Supreme Court decisions in this area over the last
forty years indicates that the Court will extend the right to appointed
counsel to those charged with misdemeanors. Virginia's reluctance to
take this step prior to such a decision has undoubtedly been a result of
the practical considerations mentioned above concerning the demand
on the state's financial and legal resources, in conjunction with the
failure of the Supreme Court to enunciate its position on the subject.
However the burden on the finances and manpower of the state may
not be as overwhelming as initially indicated.49 The cost of such a
system, if feasable, should be accepted by Virginia as a necessary sacri-
fice for the extension of due process to as many indigent persons as
possible who are faced with criminal charges.
P. DEB. R.
4 7 See, e.g., Manson, supra note 28, at 175.
48 See VA. CODE AziN. § 16.1-132 to -136 (1960). Since appeal of a midemeanor con-
viction to a court of record is a matter of right, due process requirements would be
satisfied if counsel were appointed only in courts of record. As a practical matter, the
majority of misdemeanor cases in courts not of record involve uncomplicated cases in
which the assistance of counsel would not be necessary.
4 9 See TAsK FORCE REPORT 55.
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